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Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered
Terms of Directors: Is the California
Climate Warming to Corporations?
Historically, California's legislature has stood steadfastly behind
policies designed to protect shareholders and creditors, at the ex-
pense of corporate management, in the development of the state's
corporation laws. At the same time, other jurisdictions, primarily
Delaware, have adopted less restrictive corporation laws to make
their states attractive corporate domiciles. After decades of watch-
ing corporations flock to other states to incorporate, the California
legislature decided to act. Recent legislation suggests that Califor-
nia has made a concerted effort to provide a hospitable environ-
ment for corporations.
Although California is a leader in other areas of law, in the realm
of corporate governance of public companies California is relatively
powerless. A corporation is generally controlled by the laws of the
state of incorporation.' California, while boasting the world's sixth
largest economy, is the state of incorporation of only three Fortune
500 companies and less than four percent of the companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange.'
By contrast, more than half of the publicly traded Fortune 500
1. This concept is referred to as the "internal affairs doctrine." The internal affairs
doctrine historically established jurisdiction over corporations. The modern view casts the
doctrine as a choice of law rule. See, e.g., Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Cor-
porate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 461 (1968); Oldham, Regulating the Regulators:
Limitations Upon A State's Ability to Regulate Corporations With Multistate Contacts,
5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 181 (1980) [hereinafter Oldham, Regulating the Regulators]. A cor-
poration's domicile is generally considered its state of incorporation, and will be treated
as such here. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra, at 461.
2. CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, A RECOMMENDATION
FOR A CALIFORNIA POLICY 2 (1988) [hereinafter SENATE COMMISSION].
The Commission, comprised of "prominent members of the business, academic, invest-
ment and political communities," is charged with evaluating California's role in govern-
ance, with an eye toward maintaining stability among California corporations, and avoid-
ing further loss of California corporations to other states. Id. at 5.
companies are domiciled in Delaware. 3 This gap between California
and Delaware further widened in the early 1980s when, of forty pub-
licly held companies that reincorporated in Delaware fourteen were
previously California corporations.4 Delaware's enviable position re-
sults from a body of laws favoring corporate management over
shareholders, and a wealth of judicial decisions supporting this
policy.5
Most states have participated in this "race to the bottom" and
have patterned their corporation statutes after Delaware's.7 Califor-
nia, sometimes called the "lone rebel," s has steadfastly stood by its
policy of protecting "creditors, security holders, and prospective pur-
chasers of securities rather than facilitat[ing] corporate operations." 9
Thus, notwithstanding the physical presence of these large compa-
nies within the state, it is not surprising that California is home to so
few public corporations. To regain control over these foreign corpo-
rations, 10 the California legislature enacted a statute whereby Cali-
fornia law governs corporations with significant operations within the
state.'1 However, this statute is now known as a "paper tiger"' 12 be-
cause it expressly excludes publicly held companies. 3
California's lack of control over publicly held companies has be-
come obvious in the context of corporate takeovers. Other states with
more liberal corporation statutes are better able to attract and retain
3. See Anti-Takeover Laws Can Help Even Up the Odds, L.A. Times, Nov. 7,
1989, at D13, col. 3 [hereinafter Anti-Takeover Laws]; Letter from Phillip M. Hawley
to Shareholders of Carter-Hawley-Hale (July 12, 1984) (urging shareholders to approve
the company's reincorporation in Delaware) [hereinafter Hawley].
4. Hawley, supra note 3. Some of the companies that were previously incorpo-
rated in California, and subsequently reincorporated in Delaware include Potlatch, Occi-
dental Petroleum, Times-Mirror, Disney, and Wells Fargo. SENATE COMMISSION, supra
note 2, at 40.
5. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L. J.
663, 696 (1974).
6. This term, which describes an effort by states to provide the least restrictive
corporation law to insure that their corporations will not flee to Delaware, has been at-
tributed to the late Professor Cary. See Cary, supra note 5, at 666. For an earlier view,
see Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (Justice Bran-
deis characterized New Jersey's permissive statute as creating a race to laxity). See also
Comment, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 119 (1976)
("most states have to some extent acquiesced and followed Delaware's lead").
7. See Cary, supra note 5, at 665-66; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 435-36; Comment,
supra note 6, at 119.
8. Oldham, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 1, at 215.
9. Comment, Choice of Corporate Domicile, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 518, 519 (1961);
see also, High Court Lets States Curb Hostile Takeovers, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at
Al, col. 4 (California is characterized by Investors Responsibility Research Center in
Washington, D.C. as "pro-shareholder") [hereinafter High Court].
10. A corporation incorporated elsewhere but authorized to do business in Califor-
nia by the Secretary of State is "foreign."
11. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
12. Comment, supra note 6, at 129-30.
13. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
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public companies, and they have passed anti-takeover legislation to
protect their corporate citizens.' 4 Similar legislation in California
would be ineffective because arguably it would not apply to the large
corporate giants involved in these takeovers. 5 Therefore, California
is faced with the choice of either (1) doing nothing and continuing to
abrogate authority over large corporations with substantial business
contacts within the state,'6 or (2) entering the "race to the bottom"
by relaxing its corporation law in favor of management to encourage
those public companies already incorporated here to stay,17 to cause
new entities to choose California as their domiciles, or to lure ex-
isting companies to the state. If California enters the "race to the
bottom" and becomes the corporate domicile of choice for companies
with significant operations within the state, it will be able to retain
legislative control over these companies. However, to achieve this ob-
jective California will have to shift from a pro-shareholder position
to a position favoring corporate management. Thus, the historic poli-
cies of the state will still not apply to these large corporations.
On September 15, 1989, California overwhelmingly passed new
corporate legislation,"8 adding one new code section 19 and amending
three others.2" The new law allows listed companies2' to stagger
terms of directors,22 and to make cumulative voting optional.23 This
recent legislation suggests that perhaps California has entered the
proverbial race. Cumulative voting24 and one-year, non-staggered
14. See SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2 at 3; High Court, supra note 9, at Al8,
col. 2; see also Note, State Regulation of Takeovers: Delaware's State Statute Is Best
Choice Available, 14 J. CORP. L. 661, 668 (1989) (anti-takeover statutes have become
"increasingly popular" since the mid-1980s).
15. SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3.
16. Id. at 4.
17. See Monks & Lerach, What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Fed-
eral Regulation? What is the Impact of Delaware Incorporations on California's Sover-
eignty and Corporate Law? in SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 40.
18. 1989 Cal. Stat. 876 (Assembly Bill No. 1929, 1989-90 Regular Session). This
bill passed the assembly and the senate by votes of 66 to 2 and 39 to 0, respectively. It
was approved by Governor Deukmejian and chaptered by the Secretary of State on Sep-
tember 26, 1989.
19. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5 (West Supp. 1990).
20. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301, 303, 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
21. Similarly to CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e), section 301.5(d) defines listed com-
panies as those traded on the American or New York exchanges or over-the-counter. See
also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301, 301.5 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
23. Id. § 708.
24. Under cumulative voting shareholders are entitled to spread all of their votes
among one or more directors when voting for directors. By cumulating votes, a minority
faction of shareholders may be able to obtain representation on the corporate board. CAL.
terms for directors25 were previously mandatory provisions of Cali-
fornia's corporation law, long considered pro-shareholder positions.
This Comment focuses on this recent legislation and discusses
whether these changes signal a dramatic shift in California's attitude
toward public companies. In doing so, this Comment first addresses
the origin of corporation statutes, the application of the internal af-
fairs doctrine, and the viability of a federal corporation law. Second,
it discusses California's historical approach to corporations. Third,
the specifics of this new legislation are described, along with a dis-
cussion of the criticisms of the prior provisions. Finally, this Com-
ment highlights other recent developments in California's corpora-
tion law. Its conclusion is that California has entered the race by
virtue of these recent changes.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Origin of Corporation Statutes
Corporation law originated historically as restrictions and control
over corporate charters. In 1896 New Jersey was the first state to
promulgate a "modern liberal corporation statute[]." 6  Subse-
quently, other states' corporation statutes changed the corporate law
emphasis through what have become known as "enabling acts"
'2 7
which allow "management to operate with minimum interference. '' 2
Delaware, seeking to raise revenues, enacted a liberal corporation
statute in 1899.29 Delaware's act made it very easy for corporations
doing business out-of-state to be domiciled within the state, so long
as the corporation's charter allowed for out-of-state operations.
Through franchise taxes, Delaware began to reap the benefits of its
liberal statute.30
To achieve this objective, Delaware's statute was decidedly pro-
CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). The converse of cumulative voting is
straight voting wherein each director is elected by a majority vote. Under straight voting,
even a 49% minority holder has virtually no say in corporate elections.
25. With one year terms, all directors are elected each year. The reasons for non-
staggered terms are to keep directors accountable to their shareholders, and to prevent
directors from becoming too comfortable in their positions. Id. § 301.
26. Cary, supra note 5 at 664; see also, Kirk, A Case Study in Legislative Oppor-
tunism: How Delaware Used the Federal-State System to Attain Corporate Pre-Emi-
nence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233 (1984).,
27. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 433; Cary, supra note 5, at 666.
28. Cary, supra note 5, at 666.
29. Kirk, supra note 26, at 252-53; Cary, supra note 5, at 664.
30. In 1899, the first year that the statute was effective, Delaware chartered only
421 corporations and brought in franchise taxes and filing fees of $36,000 (roughly seven
percent of the state's total revenues). By 1919, however, total taxes from corporate char-
ters were $1.2 million, out of total state revenues of $3.5 million. Kirk, supra note 26, at
254-55. In fiscal year 1984, Delaware brought in over $92 million in fees and taxes
(roughly 28% of the state's total revenue). Id. at 259.
470
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management. For example, early provisions of the statute reduced
directors' exposure to liability and allowed for lenient dividend distri-
bution schemes."' Thus Delaware took the lead in the world of cor-
porate governance and has never looked back. 32
B. The Internal Affairs Doctrine & The "Race to the Bottom"
Delaware's rise in the area of corporate governance was aided by
the internal affairs doctrine. Under this doctrine, a corporation is
deemed a creation of the state of its incorporation and, therefore, is
governed by that state's laws, notwithstanding the company's geo-
graphical location.3 The main policy reasons advanced for the inter-
nal affairs doctrine are uniformity and certainty in choice of law
questions for corporations with contacts in more than one state.34
The result of this doctrine, in conjunction with Delaware's liberal
statute, is that Delaware law now governs a great portion of public
corporations. 35 Furthermore, Delaware law is considered by some to
be the de facto law of corporations in the United States. 6
Some commentators view this race to the bottom as the quintes-
sence of the free market theory that "well-informed participants will
choose what is best for themselves." 37 Others contend this competi-
tion is unhealthy, and only leads to a decidedly pro-management
31. Id. at 255.
32. See id. at 233; Cary, supra note 5, at 668. See generally Kirk, supra note 26,
for a detailed history on and the development of Delaware's corporation law, which is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
33. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 440; Oldham, Regulating the Regulators, supra
note 1, at 181.
34. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 441; Oldham, Regulating the Regulators, supra
note 1, at 187; Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling
Upon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 99 (1977) [hereinafter Oldham, Tram-
pling Upon the Tramp]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 41
comment a (1971).
35. See supra text accompanying note 1.
36. See, e.g., SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2 at 40. Today, many states have
patterned their corporation statutes after Delaware's code in an attempt to retain public
companies within their jurisdictions and, therefore, under their control. This effort by
most states has been termed the "race to the bottom." See supra text accompanying
notes 6-7; see also Cary, supra note 5, at 666 ("only two or three jurisdictions have
resisted this temptation at all").
37. Herzel & Richman, Foreword to R. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS at lxix (1988). But see Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 920 (1982). Professor Fischel calls the compe-
tition for corporations the "climb to the top," rather than the race to the bottom, on the
premise that Delaware's "corporation law maximizes, rather than minimizes sharehold-
ers' welfare." Id.
point of view, while ignoring other implications. 8 Nonetheless, Pro-
fessor Cary points out that if Delaware had not sought to be the
leader in corporate charters, some other state would have begun the
race in the hopes of attracting "the lucrative business of
incorporating."3 9
C. Federal Corporate Law: A Case for Federal Preemption
Some writers have suggested that the best way to end the race to
the bottom would be to provide one uniform federal corporation law
that would preempt state law.40 According to Professor Cary, to
compete in the area of corporate governance, states now have no
choice but to place management in a position of omnipotence, to the
detriment of a public policy favoring shareholders and creditors. 4'
Thus, in order to "escape from the present predicament in which a
pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, and indeed deni-
grates national corporate policy," 42 federal legislation is required.
This viewpoint is echoed by Professor Kaplan:
If.. . state corporation laws are trending toward virtual uniformity, then
• . . such uniformity [should] be prescribed by Congress rather than by
emulation of Delaware's Corporation Act. There is no more reason for the
corporation law in the United States to be set by the standards of Delaware
than there is for the conflicts rules of the world to be promulgated by the
Island of Tobago.' 3
Professor Cary cites several reasons for a federal corporation law.
The two reasons most relevant here are (1) the "need for uniformity,
so that states shall not compete with each other by lowering stan-
dards," and (2) "there should be as much federal concern about the
management of the public issue company and about its share owners
as about the investor engaged in the purchase and sale of its
stock."'44 It is said that because "[t]he largest corporations are not
restricted to any one state, . . . the problems they cause [also are
not] so restricted. 45
While these arguments are appealing, especially to a state like
38. See Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Com-
petition" vs. Federal Regulation in R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORA-
TION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 100-08 (1980).
39. Cary, supra note 5, at 665.
40. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPO-
RATION (1976); Cary, supra note 5, at 663; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 480; Comment, Law
for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861,
898 (1969).
41. Cary, supra note 5, at 666, 698.
42. Id. at 701.
43. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 480.
44. Cary, supra note 5, at 697. Professor Cary here refers to the federal Securities
and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, intended to provide investor protection in the
purchase and sale of securities.
45. Comment, supra note 40, at 898.
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California with little corporate control,46  other writers have
staunchly opposed a federal corporation law.47 It is argued that a
federal law would do no more than codify Delaware's law as a fed-
eral standard.48 It is also urged that a federal law would remove the
element of competition, seen as a positive force, from the area of
corporate governance.49 Concerning the interests of shareholders,
some commentators argue that shareholders "have shown no aver-
sion to incorporation in Delaware."
50
Although the arguments on both sides have merit and possibly
warrant future consideration, in the near term it has been observed
that any such legislation is "politically unrealistic."' 51 Thus, without
an immediate prospect of federal preemption, it is important to re-
view California's historical position and to predict where California
is headed in the area of corporate governance.
II. CALIFORNIA'S HISTORICAL APPROACH TO CORPORATIONS
A. The California Code
California's corporation law, unlike Delaware-type codes of other
states, has traditionally placed the interests of shareholders and
creditors above the interests of management.52 However, some writ-
ers previously believed that in spite of differing policy goals, the dif-
ferences between Delaware and California law did not overwhelm-
46. Such appeal is based on the assumption that a federal corporate law would
promote California's policies of shareholder, investor, and creditor protections, and would
provide more checks on management's control.
47. See, e.g., SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 43; Dodd & Leftwich, supra
note 38, at 108-09; Herzel & Richman, supra note 37, at lxxiii; Oldham, Regulating the
Regulators, supra note 1, at 223.
48. See SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 43.
49. Herzel & Richman, supra note 37, at lxxiii; see also Fischel, supra note 37, at
921 ("This competition in corporate charters ensures that, as in any other competitive
market, only the efficient will survive.").
50. Fischel, supra note 37, at 921. The theory here must rely on the so-called
"Wall Street Option." See, e.g., R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 536 (3d ed. 1986). This theory postulates that unhappy shareholders will sell their
shares, and that the aggregate effect of these sales sends a message to the corporation
through the market. Furthermore, from an economic efficiency point of view, the state of
incorporation decision is made with the best (albeit economic) interests of the sharehold-
ers in mind when such choice maximizes the company's value. See Dodd & Leftwich,
supra note 38, at 109.
51. Cary, supra note 5, at 700; see also Fischel, supra note 37, at 914 ("Despite
strong academic and popular support, federal regulation of corporations does not appear
likely in the near future.").
52. See Oldham, Trampling Upon the Tramp, supra note 34, at 99; Comment,
supra note 9, at 519.
ingly dictate Delaware as the domicile of choice. 53 Today, the
situation has changed dramatically.
The control exercised by Delaware and liberal states over public
companies has put California in a relatively powerless position due to
application of the internal affairs doctrine' 4 and the lack of public
companies domiciled in California."' While the internal affairs doc-
trine applies to all corporations doing business in California but in-
corporated elsewhere, its effects are particularly pronounced with
pseudo-foreign corporations.5 6 These pseudo-foreign corporations op-
erate exclusively within the state, yet they are regulated by the laws
and policies of their state of incorporation which may be at odds
with those of California. For this reason, the internal affairs doctrine
is criticized for failing to reflect the social costs of denying control to
the state where business is conducted.
57
B. Section 2115: The Paper Tiger
In an attempt to remedy this lack of control, the California legis-
lature added section 2115 which requires the application of Califor-
nia law if the corporation does over one-half of its business in the
state and over one-half of its shareholders have addresses in Califor-
nia.58 Although it has not been tested by the California Supreme
Court, section 2115 was held to be constitutional by a state appellate
court.59 However, this statute does not apply to public companies
with common stock traded on the American or New York ex-
changes, or with stock traded over-the-counter with at least 800
shareholders.6 0 Therefore, because the statute only applies to compa-
nies whose shares are not widely traded, which are often smaller
companies that usually limit their activities to one state, the very ills
that the statute attempted to combat have remained untouched.
53. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 532.
54. See SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 2.
55. See supra text accompanying note 1.
56. The pseudo-foreign corporation is defined as a corporation that operates en-
tirely within one state, while maintaining corporate domicile elsewhere. See, e.g., Kaplan,
supra note 1, at 438; Comment, supra note 6, at 124.
57. See Oldham, Trampling Upon the Tramp, supra note 34, at 99. "[T]he social
policies of the principal place of business of a pseudo-foreign corporation are supplanted
by those of the state of incorporation." Id.
58. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
59. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 852 (1982).
60. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). This exemption is
premised on the theory that "when a corporation lists its shares on a national exchange,
it subjects itself to federal securities regulations and exchange requirements which sup-
posedly provide protection for investors equivalent to that provided under California
law." Comment, supra note 6, at 129. In reality, however, the federal securities regula-
tions only serve disclosure functions and do not provide the shareholder any remedy for
corporate mismanagement. See Cary, supra note 5, at 699-700.
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C. Corporate Governance and the Hostile Takeover
The problem of corporate governance became increasingly evident
with the rise in takeover activity observable among corporations in
the last decade. When corporations located in California but incor-
porated elsewhere are taken over, the effect is often "loss of jobs,
resources and disruptions to the economy."'" Over the last four
years, twenty-three other states, including Delaware, faced with sim-
ilar losses, have passed anti-takeover statutes to protect their corpo-
rations.6 2 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has basi-
cally given the states carte blanche in anti-takeover legislation. 3
Any such legislation in California, like section 2115, would be inef-
fective because California law does not apply to the vast majority of
the corporations it would be intended to protect. Perhaps this is why
attempts in the California legislature to pass anti-takeover legislation
have failed.
6 4
A recent example of California's precarious position was the po-
tential hostile takeover of Chevron Corp. by Pennzoil Corp.6 5 Chev-
ron, incorporated in Delaware, is the largest company located in Cal-
ifornia.66 The takeover could have had a significant impact on
California's economy, due to future plant closings and consolidations
into Pennzoil's operations. If Chevron had been a California corpora-
tion, the California legislature could have enacted emergency legisla-
tion to prevent a hostile takeover.617
Some commentators suggest that one remedy is to enlarge the
61. SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 5.
62. High Court, supra note 9, at Al, col. 2. This article also points out that these
23 states in the aggregate "are home to 784 of the nation's 1000 largest companies." Id.;
see also, Anti-Takeover Laws, supra note 3, at DI, col. 2 ("These laws became popular
in the mid-1980s as companies and their allies in state legislatures became alarmed at
the seeming ease with which corporate raiders could sell high-yield junk-bonds, take con-
trol of a target company and sell off divisions."); Schwartz, Federal Chartering Revis-
ited, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 13 (1988) ("A majority of states now have antitakeover
laws ....").
63. Most recently, the Court denied certiorari in a challenge to a Wisconsin anti-
takeover law wherein a takeover cannot be accomplished until three years have passed
after the initial takeover attempt if the proposed takeover is opposed by the corporate
board. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Wis. 1988), afl'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). Another
provocative aspect of the Wisconsin statute is that it applies to "resident domestic corpo-
rations," where residence is defined by physical presence, not by the state of incorpora-
tion. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(1)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1989).
64. Anti-Takeover Laws, supra note 3, at Dl, col. 2.
65. L.A. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at D1, col. 5.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 63.
scope of section 2115 to include public as well as privately held com-
panies.' 8 There is some question, however, whether such a law could
withstand a constitutional challenge based on the commerce clause.60
Furthermore, the risk associated with section 2115, which is trig-
gered by the volume of business conducted within California, is that
companies seeking to avoid the application of California law will
take their business elsewhere.7"
III. THE NEW LEGISLATION: CUMULATIVE VOTING &
STAGGERED TERMS
'A. Prior Law
Mandatory cumulative voting and annual election of all directors
were historically considered the two provisions of the California code
most favorable to shareholders and most detrimental to manage-
ment.71 This section will explore the origin, operation, and intent of
these two provisions.
1. Cumulative Voting
Under section 708, shareholders at any election of directors may
cumulate their votes, as long as the candidates they intend to vote
for have been nominated prior to the election, and all shareholders
are given notice of the intent to cumulate.7 2 This provision gives a
shareholder a number of votes equal to the number of shares owned
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. These votes can
then be allocated among one or more directors up for election.
Cumulative voting was adopted in California in its Constitution of
1879.73 Although the constitutional provision was repealed in 1930,
the legislature reinstated the right to vote cumulatively in 1931 and
it has existed ever since. 4 The theory behind cumulative voting is
68. See SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 44; see also, Oldham, Regulating
the Regulators, supra note 1, at 249 (such a rule "would provide certainty in corporate
choice of law while permitting the state with clearly the predominate interest in regulat-
ing a corporation to do so.").
69. SENATE COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 39 (such a law might adversely affect
interstate commerce by "subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations").
70. See Comment, supra note 6, at 146.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708(a)-(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
73. Corporations Committee, Business Law Section of the State Bar of California,
Memorandum on Legislative Proposal to Permit Classification of Directors by Term of
Offlce and Elimination of Cumulative Voting for Corporations with Publicly Traded
Securities 4 (June 18, 1987) (available at the State Bar of California) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
74. Id. at 4; see also Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16
Bus. LAW. 550, 572 (1961). California's official position on the repeal of cumulative
voting in 1930 was that because of the burden of this provision, "'[t]housands of corpo-
rations, organized by California citizens. to transact business in California, incorporate
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that it provides the common shareholder with "power over and rep-
resentation on the board of directors."75 .Under the straight voting
alternative method,76 the majority will always rule and the minority
shareholder will be at a distinct representational disadvantage."
While the majority still controls a majority of the board with cumu-
lative voting, the minority maintains a voice in director elections.
To fully understand this concept, an example of cumulative voting
in the election of directors is instructive. The first step is to deter-
mine the number of shares a minority shareholder must vote to elect
one director.7 The formula for this determination is as follows: S/
(D+ 1) + 1,19 where S represents the number of shares being voted,
and D represents the total number of directors to be elected. There-
fore, if a company is electing five directors, and the number of shares
voted is one hundred, the number of shares necessary to elect one
director is seventeen. 0 It is important to note that this formula sets
up a reciprocal relationship: the greater the number of directors to
be elected, the fewer minority shares required to elect one director.
Likewise, if a small number of directors is to be elected, a greater
number of voting minority shares would be required.
2. Annual Election of Directors
Cumulative voting in California operates in conjunction with sec-
tion 301. Section 301 provides that each director shall be elected
under the laws of other states, because they can not [sic] obtain reasonable corporate
facilities at home.'" Id. (citation omitted).
75. Comment, supra note 9, at 524. Illinois was the first state to adopt cumulative
voting, both in the contexts of shareholder voting and voting for members of the state
legislature. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5.
76. Straight voting is election by a pure majority of votes cast, where the number
of votes cast per shareholder is simply the number of shares held. See also supra note 24.
77. Note that with straight voting only a bare majority of fifty-one percent is re-
quired to elect a director. Therefore, a minority faction could be significant (e.g.. 49%)
and still be precluded from gaining representation on the board. See, e.g., Glazer, Glazer
& Grofman, Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy Into the
Equation, 35 S.C.L. REv. 295, 296 (1984) [hereinafter Glazer].
78. Note that unless the minority shareholder alone owns a substantial minority of
shares, the minority shareholder may have to combine with other minority shareholders
to achieve the desired result.
79. Friedman, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CORPORATIONS 3:153 (1988).
80. 1001(5+1) + 1 = 100/6 + 1 = 16 + 1 = 17 shares (not counting frac-
tional shares). By way of contrast, under straight voting each shareholder receives a vote
for each share owned; the shareholder may cast that number of votes for each of the
directors to be elected. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 50, at 425. Thus, a simple majority
of the voting shares will elect all directors, even if a minority faction held 49% percent
of the shares.
annually for a one year term."' Delaware takes the opposite ap-
proach and allows for staggered terms of directors.8 2 Under Dela-
ware's approach, each year only a portion of the board is up for re-
election. Under the cumulative voting formula83 it is easily seen that
staggered terms can circumvent the policy behind cumulative voting.
Assume, for example, that a corporation has three directors, each
serving a different term. Each year at the annual meeting sharehold-
ers will elect only one director. Applying the formula S/(D+ 1) +
1,84 one director under a staggered term system is still elected by a
simple majority of the voting shares.8 5 Thus, cumulative voting is
completely ineffective with the election of one director. Furthermore,
its effects are somewhat diluted with any election of a small number
of directors.
California law provides further assurance that cumulative voting
will not be rendered ineffective. For example, under section 212 a
corporation generally cannot have fewer than three directors.8 Also,
any action to decrease the size of the board must be in the form of
an amendment to the articles of incorporation, a process requiring a
shareholder vote. 87 Moreover, an amendment to decrease the size of
a five-director board will not pass if more than sixteen and two-
thirds percent of the voting shares vote against the amendment. 88
B. Criticism of Cumulative Voting and Annual Election of
Directors
1. Cumulative Voting
It has been said that cumulative voting is "the greatest burden of
California law." 89 Many corporations with significant operations in
California have incorporated in Delaware primarily to avoid Califor-
nia's mandatory cumulative voting provision. 0
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1974 & Supp. 1988).
83. See supra text accompanying note 79.
84. Id.
85. 100/(1+1) + 1 = of the shares voting + 1.
86. CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
87. Id. §§ 901-903.
88. Id. §§ 194.5, 212(a). Note that this rule provides a sense of symmetry since 16
2A% of the voting shares is the number of shares required to elect one director of a board
comprised of five directors. See Friedman, supra note 79.
89. Comment, supra note 6, at 137. California was in the minority before its new
legislation in mandating cumulative voting. Thirty-four states and the Model Business
Corporation Act either provide permissive cumulative voting or make no provision for it
at all. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 6.
90. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 5, at 669; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 436. Cumulative
voting is optional in Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
Also, staggered terms are allowed. See supra text accompanying note 82. This observa-
tion is supported by the recent reincorporations in Delaware of California corporations
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Some writers believe that the fundamental problem with cumula-
tive voting is that it treats the corporate board of directors as a legis-
lative body, 91 rather than considering board management as an exec-
utive function.92 This conclusion is supported by five reasons. First is
the nature of the board's duties.9" The corporate board is charged
with determining the company's long and short term policies and de-
cisions and prescribing the means for reaching its goals.94 Cumula-
tive voting poses a risk to successful management of a corporation by
creating a danger of factionalism when directors are elected by mi-
nority interests adverse to management. 95 "While a healthy diversity
of opinion and experience, as represented by independent directors,
is desirable, factionalism is not appropriate in the board's essentially
for the express purpose of avoiding cumulative voting. See, e.g., Hawley, supra note 3
(wherein Mr. Hawley wrote that the "reason for reincorporation in Delaware is to pre-
vent The Limited Inc. from gaining representation on the company's board through the
use of California's cumulative voting procedures"); Glazer, supra note 77, at 296-97 (In
1983 Union Oil Company of California presented a proposal to its shareholders to
reincorporate in Delaware to avoid cumulative voting).
91. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5; Sturdy, supra note 74, at 552.
92. Sturdy, supra note 74, at 552.
93. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5.
94. Id.; see also Sturdy, supra note 74, at 552-53. Sturdy sets forth an extensive
list of the types of activities in which the corporate board participates. This list includes
making decisions on (1) what products or services should be offered or discontinued; (2)
what the company's debt and equity position should be; (3) plant expansion; (4) profit
margins and pricing structures; and (5) dividend distributions.
95. Sturdy, supra note 74, at 553. Sturdy analogizes the presence of an "antago-
nistic" director on the board to a stranger participating in a family argument. Sturdy
reasons that while family members may argue among themselves, the presence of an
outsider will cause the family to unite against that outside force. Thus, the presence of
hostile interests on the board will promote factionalism and stymie the board's decision
making process. Id. at 554. Sturdy wrote (in 1961): "This is why security analysts, in-
vestment bankers, lawyers whose principal practice is in the corporation field, advisers to
institutional investors, security brokers and, more recently, the university scholars with
actual experience in the business world are practically unanimous in their opposition to
mandatory cumulative voting." Id. Sturdy supports this thesis with quotes from letters
written by the New York law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, and by Dean Neil H. Jacoby
of the U.C.L.A. Business School, to the California Commissioner of Corporations in op-
position to cumulative voting. Dean Jacoby's letter stated in part:
"[C]umulative voting is wrong because it increases the probability of a divided
Board of Directors, and such division stultifies action. . . . A board of uncon-
genial persons with divided views on basic policies will delay or prevent action
which can have even worse consequences than taking the wrong action because
it defers the day when a change of policy must occur."
Id. Sturdy also cites a 1947 publication of the Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion of Harvard University and a letter from Mr. Guy Witter of Dean Witter & Co.,
both objecting to the use of cumulative voting because of its negative effect on the corpo-
rate board. Some contend that these views are still widely held today by those active in
the area of corporation law. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 6.
executive function. 96
The second reason for considering board management as an exec-
utive rather than a legislative function is that "the principal objec-
tive of a business enterprise should be profit and gain for its share-
holders, not political accommodation of competing interests.
9 7 If
corporate board meetings become breeding grounds for conflict and
hostility,98 then the board is hampered in its efforts to maximize the
company's assets.99 Third, it is contended that the typical share-
holder in a public company is an investor who, by definition, 100 holds
the stock for the purpose of economic gain and not for the right to
vote for directors (i.e. not for a political purpose). 0' Shareholders
"vote primarily by moving their investment dollars.' 02 If an investor
in a publicly held company is dissatisfied with board actions and
thus fears a loss in share value, the shareholder will choose to invest
in another corporation. This "power of voting by selling off shares"
has particular import when an institutional investor is involved, be-
cause these investors control large blocks of stock. 0 3 The sale of an
individual investor's shares may not send shockwaves through a cor-
poration. However, any changes in holdings of institutional investors
are likely to send a strong message to the corporate board and could
adversely affect stock prices. 04
A fourth problem associated with cumulative voting is the exis-
tence of factionalism on the board which may give rise to threatened
litigation, thus discouraging independent directors from serving on
corporate boards. 05 Finally, cumulative voting is sometimes used as
96. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5.
97. Id. Director liability for board actions usually only results from economic loss
to the corporation or its shareholders.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
99. See Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5.
100. An investment is defined as "[a~n expenditure to acquire property or other
assets in order to produce revenue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (5th ed. 1979).
101. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5. This premise is supported by Professor
Fischel who queries "why would shareholders ever voluntarily invest in firms located in
Delaware, given its alleged promanagement bias which supposedly exacerbates the detri-
ment to shareholders?" Fischel, supra note 37, at 917.
102. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5; see also supra note 50 for a discussion of
the "Wall Street Option."
103. Institutional investors "[a]s a group ... are now the largest single owner of
publicly held corporations; their holdings in the aggregate are in excess of forty per cent
of the outstanding shares of listed publicly held corporations, and in specific corporations
the percentage may run over fifty percent." R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
IN A NUTSHELL 273 (2d ed. 1987).
104. When an institutional investor decides to liquidate its holdings in a particular
security the result may be an artificially depressed stock price. Further, in the takeover
context, shares held by institutional investors "are often absolutely critical, and . . .
[these investors] often effectively determine who should ultimately control the corpora-
tion." Id. at 274.
105. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 6.
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"a prelude for 'greenmail.' "o106 Furthermore, even if the above
problems fail to cast sufficient doubt on the advisability of cumula-
tive voting, the mechanical aspects may be reason enough to dis-
pense with it.10 7 Cumulative voting may confuse the shareholder and
may create the opposite of the desired result. 08 The example above
which illustrated how cumulative voting works'0 9 was intentionally
made simple. However, in the public company environment the pro-
cess is much more complex." 0
The main problem in a large public entity is lack of knowledge on
the part of both minority and majority shareholders."' Until all
proxies are counted at the annual meeting, the number of voting
shares is unknown. However, even after the number of voting shares
is determined, neither the majority nor the minority knows how the
proxies were voted, nor how those shareholders voting in person will
vote." 2 Thus, this "[1]ack of knowledge of either of these unknowns
may cause a substantial difference in the eventual make-up of the
board of directors."
' "13
As noted above in the context of greenmail," 4 cumulative voting
can have substantial adverse effects on hostile takeovers, which may
be detrimental to the very minority interests cumulative voting pur-
ports to protect."' Using greenmail tactics, corporate raiders buy up
shares of a corporation to force the corporation to pay a premium to
reacquire those shares to avoid takeover." 6 Thus, even if a corpora-
106. Id. A hostile faction may buy up a substantial minority of the corporation's
shares and threaten to place minority directors on the board just to induce the corpora-
tion to buy back those shares at a premium to fend off the attack. See, e.g., R. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 103, at 456. This concept is referred to as "greenmail."
107. Sturdy, supra note 74, at 565. Sturdy calls cumulative voting "the numbers
racket." Id.
108. Id.; see, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 150 (1883) (majority used
straight voting in election for six directors, while minority voted cumulatively, spreading
its votes over four directors, which resulted in the minority electing four out of six direc-
tors); see also, Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N.E. 17 (1903)
(minority elected two out of three directors); Schwartz v. State ex. rel. Schwartz, 61
Ohio St. 497, 56 N.E. 201 (1900) (minority elected five of nine directors).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
110. See Sturdy, supra note 74, at 565.
Ill. Id. at 566.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 106.
115. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 7. This problem has been magnified in re-
cent years with the significant increase in takeover attempts in the 1970s and 1980s. See
R. HAMILTON, supra note 50, at 788. But see infra note 119 and accompanying text for a
view that takeovers actually benefit minority shareholders.
116. See supra note 106.
tion is successful in staving off a takeover, the corporate treasury is
depleted, thereby reducing per-share value and negatively impacting
the investor.
117
'In other situations, cumulative voting is utilized to gain control of
the corporate board in preparation for a takeover attempt.11 8 It is
argued that minority shareholders benefit from cumulative voting
not through its purported democratic effects but rather because of an
efficient market." 9 Others argue, however, that there are other fac-
tors to consider in the context of corporate takeovers besides share-
holder wealth. 2 ° Some of these factors are the effect on the commu-
nity due to the loss of one of its corporate citizens, the waste of
corporate resources, disruption to the corporation in management's
attempt to fend off a takeover bid,121 and the ultimate disbanding by
a profit-motivated acquirer of "money losing but beneficial activi-
ties.' 22 Some also contend corporate takeovers are injurious to the
economy as a whole through the extensive use of debt to finance
takeovers. 123  However, there is evidence that because of the
117. For a classic example of greenmail in operation, see Heckmann v. Ahmanson,
168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985) (efforts by Saul Steinberg to purport-
edly gain control of Walt Disney Productions, which resulted in a profit to Steinberg of
approximately $60 million when Disney purchased his shares).
118. See, e.g., Hawley, supra note 3 (wherein it was noted that The Limited Inc.
was attempting to obtain representation on Carter-Hawley-Hale's board as a prelude to a
tender offer). A tender offer is one method of acquisition whereby the acquirer offers
either shares of its company or cash to existing holders of the target company's stock.
See R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 478.
119. See, e.g., Note, Fear of the Hostile Takeover: Having Tamed and Reined the
-Beasts, State Regulation Would Kill Them as Well, 14 J. CORP. L. 133, 140 (1988)
("Most studies indicate that shareholders of the acquired firm profit from the acquisi-
tion."). The argument is that a company will be a target for takeover when "[t]he pur-
chaser ... believes that it can manage the assets of the firm more profitably than in-
cumbent management." Fischel, supra note 37, at 926. "Transfers of control, therefore,
facilitate the movement of assets to more highly valued uses and thereby benefit share-
holders and society as a whole." Id. at 927.
120. See Note, supra note 119, at 143.
121. For a classic example of the disruption cumulative voting can cause when
there are conflicting factions seeldng to control the board of directors, see Campbell v.
Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957). In Loew's, because of a threat to
wrest control through the use of cumulative voting by insurgents, incumbent manage-
ment agreed to a board of equal members from each faction with one neutral director.
Trouble began when several directors from the management faction resigned, leaving the
insurgents with a majority on the board, although management still had control of opera-
tions. The insurgent faction wanted to remove the president of the company, but was
unable to hold a board meeting for lack of a quorum because the management directors
carefully stayed away from board meetings. The insurgents sued, but the matter was
ultimately decided by the shareholders who voted in favor of management, although the
insurgents were able to gain board representation through cumulative voting. Manage-
ment later proposed that the corporation abandon cumulative voting and the shareholders
agreed. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 50, at 858.
122. Note, supra note 119, at 143.
123. Id. at 144.
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problems in the junk bond market,"" the highly leveraged takeover
is on the decline.12 5 In short, although cumulative voting was origi-
nally created to protect minority shareholder voting power, it may
actually operate to maximize shareholder wealth, albeit at the possi-
ble expense of incumbent management and the community at large.
2. Annual Election of Directors
As noted above, the use of non-staggered, annual terms for direc-
tors has maintained the integrity of cumulative voting.' 26 However,
just as mandatory cumulative voting has disappeared from most
states' corporation laws, 2' California was, until the new legislation,
"'one of only two states"' 2 8 to mandate annual, non-staggered terms.
The advantages that longer, staggered terms offer a corporation will
now be explored.
For on-going corporate governance, longer terms provide greater
continuity on the corporate board which benefits the corporation. 12 9
Longer terms afford outside directors13 0 an opportunity to become
familiar with "the affairs of the corporation and to concentrate on
• .. the long term growth and well-being of the enterprise.''3
Moreover, a corporation with a stable board will be better able to
"attract independent outside directors."' 32
A more compelling argument for staggered terms of directors
arises with corporate takeovers. 33 Staggered terms are often consid-
ered a "shark repellant,' 3 4 used by companies seeking to avoid a
124. Junk bonds are unsecured debt instruments of a corporation, often issued to
finance a takeover attempt.
125. See Anti-Takeover Laws, supra note 3, at D1, col. 2.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
128. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 2. The other state is Arkansas. Id.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Outside directors are those members of a corporate board who are not mem-
bers of corporate management, although they may have other ties to the corporation.
Those directors who are also employed by the corporation are called inside directors. See,
e.g., R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 457, 464.
131. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 3.
132. Id.
133. While the above mentioned advantages for staggered terms have logical ap-
peal, in reality the corporate board, even with annual terms, often remains fairly con-
stant. Incumbent management's slate in the annual proxy statement often contains direc-
tors currently serving out a one-year term, and those directors are virtually assured of re-
election. See Comment, supra note 6, at 136.
134. A shark repellant is a tactic whereby the corporation, either through amend-
ment of its bylaws or corporate charter, in advance of a takeover bid, makes it more
difficult for the potential acquirer to gain control. The goal is to encourage the "shark to
takeover attempt.13 5 Staggered terms ensure that the acquiring en-
tity cannot garner a majority of the board for at least two years,
depending on the size of the board, unless directors can be removed
without cause. 136 Some writers argue that staggered terms actually
benefit the minority shareholders by protecting "against a radical
and rapid unconsented [sic] change in the enterprise to [their]
detriment."' 3
C. New Legislation
1. The Statutory Language
Recent legislation in California allows for optional cumulative vot-
ing and staggered terms of directors. This major change to Califor-
nia's Corporations Code appears in newly created section 301.5,
which is incorporated by reference into sections 301 and 708. It also
appears in substantial changes to section 303.13
Section 301 previously provided for election of directors at each
year's annual meeting, with those directors serving until the next an-
nual meeting.'3 9 The amended statute incorporates section 301.5140
which allows staggered terms.' Similarly, section 708, which man-
dated cumulative voting at the shareholder's option in election of di-
rectors, now also incorporates section 301.5142 which allows a corpo-
ration to opt out of cumulative voting. 4 3 In other words, section
look elsewhere" where such impediments might not exist. Note, supra note 119, at 141.
These types of corporate actions in advance of a takeover are also referred to as "porcu-
pine provisions." See R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 466.
135. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 464; Bogen, State Law Considerations:
California, in 1 ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 1987, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 533 (Corporate Law and Practice No. 567, 1987) [hereinafter Bogen];
Memorandum, supra note 73, at 4.
136. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 464.
137. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 4. But see supra note 119 (takeovers actu-
ally benefit shareholders under the efficient market theory).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
139. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
140. The pertinent part of section 301 which provided for annual terms of directors
is amended as follows: "(a) Except as provided by Section 301.5, at each annual meeting
of shareholders, directors shall be elected to hold office until the next annual meeting.
However, to effectuate a voting shift (Section 194.7) the articles may provide that direc-
tors hold office for a shorter term . Id. § 301(a) (italics indicate amendment).
141. See infra note 146.
142. Section 708 now reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in Section 301.5, every shareholder complying with
subdivision (b) and entitled to vote at any election of directors may cumulate
such shareholder's votes and give one candidate a number of votes equal to the
number of directors to be elected multiplied by the number of votes to which
the shareholder's shares are normally entitled, or distribute the shareholder's
votes . . . among as many candidates as the shareholder thinks fit ....
Id. § 708(a) (italics indicate amendment).
143. See infra note 146.
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301.5 now stands as the "exception to the general rule" stated in
these two code sections.
1 44
The inclusion of section 301.5 in these sections substantially alters
their effect. Under section 301.5, a listed corporation 145 now has the
option of eliminating or opting out of cumulative voting and creating
staggered terms of directors. This is accomplished by amendment to
either the bylaws or the articles of incorporation. 46 However, these
changes "may only be adopted by the approval of the board and the
outstanding shares (section 152) voting as a single class, notwith-
standing Section 903.''a4
This new legislation only applies to listed companies, as defined by
statute. The rationale for this limitation is that shareholders of pub-
licly traded securities may take advantage of the "Wall Street Op-
tion" if they are unhappy with the corporation's actions.' 4 8 The mi-
nority shareholder of a closely-held corporation generally does not
have this option due to the lack of a market for a close corporation's
144. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 10. Whether the "exception" will become
the "general rule" remains to be seen.
145. The text of section 301.5(d) is as follows:
For purposes of this section, a "listed corporation" means any of the following:
(1) A corporation with outstanding shares listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change or the American Stock Exchange.
(2) A corporation with outstanding securities designated as qualified for trad-
ing as a national market system security on the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers Automatic Quotation System (or any successor national market
system) if the corporation has at least 800 holders of its equity securities as of
the record date of the corporation's most recent annual meeting of sharehold-
ers. For purposes of determining the number of holders of a corporation's eq-
uity securities under this paragraph, there shall be included, in addition to the
number of recordholders reflected on the corporation's stock records, the num-
ber of holders of the equity securities held in the name of any nominee holder
which furnishes the corporation with a certification equivalent to the certifica-
tion permitted by subdivision (a) of Section 2115, provided, that the corpora-
tion retains the certification with the record of shareholders and makes the
certification available for inspection and copying in the same manner as pro-
vided in Section 1600.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5(d) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
146. The statutory language is as follows: "A listed corporation may, by amend-
ment of its articles or bylaws, adopt provisions to divide the board of directors into two or
three classes to serve for terms of two or three years respectively, or to eliminate cumula-
tive voting, or both." Id. § 301.5(a).
147. Id. Under section 152, approval of the outstanding shares means a majority
vote at a meeting of all outstanding shares entitled to vote, not just approval by a major-
ity of shares represented at the meeting. CAL. CORP. CODE § 152 (West 1977 & Supp.
1990). Section 903 provides that articles amendments which affect a particular class of
shares must receive the approval of the outstanding shares of that class. Id. § 903.
148. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 8; see also supra note 50 for an explanation
of the "Wall Street Option."
shares. 49
Section 301.5(a) does allow nonlisted companies to prospectively
create staggered terms or to opt out of cumulative voting by amend-
ing bylaws or articles. However, such amendments will not become
effective until the corporation meets the statutory definition of a
listed company in section 301.5(d). 50 The purpose of this provision
is to allow small companies to put into place their desired corporate
policies and procedures in advance of an initial public offering.' 1"
Currently, privately held companies incorporate in other states (even
though they are now subject to California law by the operation of
section 2115)152 to take advantage of those states' lenient laws for
public companies in the event of future growth.
Under section 301.5(b), a corporation that chooses to stagger
terms is subject to provisions to insure "that a sufficient number of
directors will be elected each year and that each class on the board
of directors will be approximately the same size. "153 This subsection
also provides that staggered terms may originate at the same meet-
149. See, e.g., Sturdy, supra note 74, at 557. Sturdy recognizes that
A close corporation presents quite a different picture from the large publicly
held corporation. In the close corporation there are typically a few owners,
probably each with a substantial percentage of the stock. . . . There is un-
likely to be a market for his shares, except to the other owners, and he proba-
bly doesn't desire to sell out in any event.
Id. This excerpt highlights the elements which define a close corporation: few sharehold-
ers and no ready market for their shares. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 448.
150. The pertinent statutory language is as follows:
After the issuance of shares, a corporation which is not a listed corporation
may, by amendment of its articles or bylaws, adopt provisions to be effective
when the corporation becomes a listed corporation to divide the board of direc-
tors into two or three classes to serve for terms of two or three years respec-
tively, or to eliminate cumulative voting, or both.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
Subsection (e) provides that a listed corporation has to include in the certificate of
amendment "a statement of the facts showing that the corporation is a listed corporation
within the meaning of subdivision (d)." Id. § 301.5(e). Also, if a corporation is not a
listed corporation and decides to effect these changes, the following statement is required:
"This provision shall become effective only when the corporation becomes a listed corpo-
ration within the meaning of Section 301.5 . . . ." Id.
151. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 9. An initial public offering (commonly re-
ferred to as an IPO) is synonymous with "going public," which is defined as "the first
public distribution of securities by an issuer pursuant to registration under the securities
acts." R. HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 456.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
153. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 8. Subsection (b) reads as follows:
If the board of directors is divided into two classes pursuant to subdivision (a),
the authorized number of directors shall be no less than six and one-half of the
directors or as close an approximation as possible shall be elected at each an-
nual meeting of shareholders. If the board of directors is divided into three
classes, the authorized number of directors shall be no less than nine and one-
third of the directors or as close an approximation as possible shall be elected
at each annual meeting of shareholders.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
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ing at which the vote to amend the articles or bylaws under subsec-
tion (a) takes place. However, the amendments must receive share-
holder approval.1
5 4
Finally, section 301.5(c) applies to companies that adopt stag-
gered terms but keep cumulative voting. Under this section, when
directors of more than one class are up for election, votes can only be
cumulated within each class. 155 While this provision may limit the
effectiveness of cumulative voting, 15 "as a practical matter . . . [it]
will apply only on the initial division of the board of directors into
classes and if the entire board is removed."' 157
The new legislation also significantly changed section 303. First,
under section 303(a)(3), if a company chooses to stagger terms
under section 301.5, a director cannot be removed without cause if
the votes against removal would have been sufficient to elect the di-
rector under cumulative voting.' 58 Before the amendment of section
303(a), a majority of the outstanding shares could remove the entire
board without cause.'5 9 Second, section 303 now provides that "an
amendment to the Articles of Incorporation reducing the number of
classes of directors does not remove a director prior to the expiration
154. The pertinent language is as follows:
Directors of a listed corporation may be elected by classes at a meeting of
shareholders at which an amendment to the articles or bylaws described in
subdivision (a) is approved, but the extended terms for directors are contingent
on that approval, and in the case of an amendment to the articles, the filing of
any necessary amendment to the articles pursuant to Section 905 or 910.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); see supra note 147 for code
provisions on shareholder approval.
155. Subsection (c) reads as follows: "If directors for more than'one class are to be
elected by the shareholders at any one meeting of shareholders and the election is by
cumulative voting pursuant to Section 708, votes may be cumulated only for directors to
be elected within each class." Id. § 301.5(c).
156. The smaller the number of directors to be elected, the larger the number of
minority shares necessary to gain minority representation. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-81.
157. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 9.
158. The code section reads as follows:
(3) A director of a corporation whose board of directors is classified pursuant
to Section 301.5 may not be removed if the votes cast against removal of the
director, or not consenting in writing to the removal, would be sufficient to
elect the director if voted cumulatively (without regard to whether shares may
otherwise be voted cumulatively) at an election at which the same total number
of votes were cast (or, if the action is taken by written consent, all shares enti-
tled to vote were voted) and either the number of directors elected at the most
recent annual meeting of shareholders, or if greater, the number of directors
for whom removal is being sought, were then being elected.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 303(a)(3) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
159. Id. § 303(a).
of the director's term of office.' 160 This section gives the same pro-
tection to a classified board as that accorded to a non-classified
board, such that directors currently serving out their terms cannot be
eliminated by action to decrease the size of the board. The signifi-
cance of these two amendments to section 303 is that "together
[they] protect a classified board . . . from removal by direct vote or
by elimination of classification by a majority shareholder following a
hostile takeover, and sustain the function of a classified board . . . in
protecting the interests of shareholders whose shares were not ac-
quired.' 61 Existing provisions for removal for cause remain
unchanged.62
2. Comparison with Delaware Law
With the passage of Assembly Bill 1929, California's Corporations
Code now substantially mirrors Delaware's corporation laws with re-
spect to cumulative voting, staggered terms, and removal of an entire
board. For example, Delaware allows a corporation to permissively
adopt cumulative voting in its certificate of incorporation.' 63 Like-
wise, Delaware permits a corporation to stagger directors' terms with
one, two, or three classes of directors serving one, two, or three year
terms. 64 However, Delaware's provisions, unlike California's, are not
limited in their application to listed companies. This difference prob-
ably is not significant because companies not listed may adopt these
provisions in anticipation of going public, 6 ' and the closely held cor-
poration may still benefit from the prior law remaining in effect as to
them. Finally, the changes made to section 303 are almost identical
to Delaware's corresponding provision, which does not allow removal
without cause of an entire, classified board. 166
IV. OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: SELECTED
LEGISLATION
The recent changes to California's Corporations Code represent a
dramatic shift in this state's policies toward corporations. Other re-
cent legislation suggests that perhaps California has entered the
160. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 10. The code section reads: "Any reduction
of the authorized number of directors or amendment reducing the number of classes of
directors does not remove any director prior to the expiration of the director's term of
office." CAL. CORP. CODE § 303(a)(3)(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990) (italics indicate
amendment).
161. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 10.
162. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990) (provisions for re-
moval of directors for cause).
163. DEL. CODE, ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
164. Id. § 141(d).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1974 & Supp. 1988).
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race, but has stalled at the starting gate. For example, a new law
was enacted in 1988,167 known as the "management buyout law,"' 68
to protect shareholders in the event of a proposed buyout from an
"interested party.'
' 6 9
This statute requires that, in the event of a management buyout,
"an affirmative opinion in writing as to the fairness of the considera-
tion to the shareholders of the corporation shall be delivered" to the
shareholders. 170 In addition, management is now compelled to dis-
close competing outside offers to its shareholders.' 7 ' The purpose of
this rule is to "protect[] investors' interests in situations in which the
very people responsible for representing the shareholders' interests
are the buyers."'1 72 This requirement deters management from un-
dertaking a buyout that will not pass financial scrutiny. Also, the
shareholders will receive enough information to make an informed
decision on the value of their shares.
17
Although this new statute is decidedly pro-shareholder, it is not at
odds with developments in Delaware. While Delaware does not have
a similar statute, the courts in that state have judicially imposed
similar requirements'74 in the context of mergers and acquisitions.
Therefore, even though California has codified its pro-shareholder
position in management buyouts, this should not be considered an
impediment to California's efforts to attract and retain corporations.
Delaware maintains a substantially similar position on this issue.
Another recent legislative development, unlike section 1203, is de-
cidedly pro-management. 75 This new statute limits or fully elimi-
nates personal liability for directors in the event of a director's
167. CAL. CORP. CODE. § 1203 (West Supp. 1990).
168. Bagley & Robertson, California Adds Rule to Protect Shareholders, Nat'l L.
J., Feb. 20, 1989, at $10, col. 1.
169. An interested party is defined by the statute as one who: "(A) directly or
indirectly controls the corporation ... (B) is, or is directly or indirectly controlled by, an
officer or director of the subject corporation, or (C) is an entity in which a material
financial interest ... is held by any director or executive officer of the subject corpora-
tion." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1203(a)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
170. Id. § 1203(a).
171. Id. § 1203(b).
172. Bagley & Robertson, supra note 168, at Sl0, col. 2.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors found
grossly negligent, and therefore outside the protection of the business judgment rule, for
failing to properly ascertain the value of the company before approving a merger); Wein-
berger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (court imposed duty of proving the
"inherent fairness" of a merger when the approving directors were on both sides of the
transaction).
175. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West Supp. 1990).
breach of duty to the corporation.'76 Section 204(a)(10) was enacted
in direct response to a similar 1986 enactment in Delaware. After
Delaware's law became effective "many public corporations changed
their legal domicile from California to Delaware."
177
Some exceptions exist where a director may not escape liability
under both the California and Delaware codes which for the most
part are identical. 78 The significant difference is that in California a
director is not immune from personal liability for acts of gross negli-
gence, whereas in Delaware a grossly negligent director may still
have immunity. Therefore, a director of a California corporation
may incur liability in some cases where a Delaware director may
not. 7  Nevertheless, with section 204(a)(10), just as in the enact-
ment of the legislation that is the main focus of this comment, the
California legislature seems to be reacting to the loss of California
public corporations to other jurisdictions. The legislature seems will-
ing to enter the "race" at the expense of the state's historic pro-
shareholder bias.
V. -CONCLUSION: IS CALIFORNIA ENTERING RACE TO THE
BOTTOM?
This new legislation was enacted in the hopes of making "incorpo-
rating in California more attractive."18 0 The question remains
whether these changes alone will help California to attain this goal.
Whether or not this goal is attained, it appears that these changes
were warranted.
Permissive cumulative voting is the best approach in this modern
era. The basis on which cumulative voting began is clearly an anach-
ronism in the public company.' 8' Further, cumulative voting has not
really protected minority interests.'82 Even the institutional investor,
who might have the strength to successfully utilize cumulative vot-
ing, usually votes with incumbent management. 8 3 Also, it was noted
176. Acterkirchen, Limitation of Directors' Liability and Indemnification of Of-
ficers and Directors-California's Response to Delaware, 9 CAL. Bus. L. REP. 63 (1987).
177. Id. Raychem Corporation, Lucky Stores, Inc., The Clorox Company, Ashton-




180. SENATE INS., CLAIMS & CORPS. Comm., REPORT ON ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1929
(Aug. 23, 1989) ("It is believed that as long as California restricts the use of staggered
or classified boards and permits cumulative voting that California based corporations will
continue to incorporate in foreign jurisdictions."). Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 91-105.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 106-22.
183. See Note, supra note 119, at 139. The State Teachers Retirement System
(STRS) and Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) strongly opposed the new leg-
islation on the grounds that "'[s]hareholders with a significant stake in the corporation
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as early as 1961, that when shareholders have the option to eliminate
cumulative voting, they overwhelming vote to do so.' 84 Finally, Cali-
fornia has other ways of ensuring that corporate boards operate in
the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation.1
8 5
As for staggered terms, opponents argue that this provision "'can
do serious harm to shareholder rights and share value,' " and that
the company may suffer if it cannot remove an incompetent director
for a period of years.' 86 This premise is faulty for two reasons. First,
if a director's actions are truly injurious to the corporation, the di-
rector can be removed for cause under section 304.187 Second, the
vast majority of companies with publicly traded securities are domi-
ciled in Delaware, which allows staggered terms."' Incorporation in
Delaware has not negatively impacted share value, nor has it de-
terred investors from investing in those companies. 8 9
This new legislation is most provocative in the takeover context. If
one supports the premise that takeover activity actually benefits mi-
nority shareholders through the premium realized on their shares,
then this new legislation, perhaps, is detrimental to the shareholders'
interests. Staggered terms and the elimination of cumulative voting
are two notorious shark repellents. 190 On the one hand, by deterring
acquisition of California corporations, one could argue that the legis-
lature has deprived the shareholder of the right to profit from a take-
over. On the other hand, corporations with their domiciles in other,
should, as a matter of right, be guaranteed that their interests will be heard by the
board; the availability of cumulative voting is the only way to provide this right.'" CON-
CURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS TO ASSEMBLY BILL 1929, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
SESSION OF 1989, at 3 (Sept. 6, 1989) [hereinafter CONCURRENCE]. This argument is
questionable in light of the premise that these investors usually vote with management.
A noteworthy attempt at using the muscle of the institutional investor to effect change
in the corporate arena was advocated by State Controller Gray Davis. Bus. Wire, Apr. 5,
1989. Davis urged the California Public Employees' Retirement System to vote against
Exxon management's slate of directors if Exxon did not act "responsibly" in the after-
math of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. Whether or not Davis' suggestion was put into
effect, however, is unknown.
184. Sturdy, supra note 74, at 574-75.
185. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990) (fiduciary
duty of care to the corporation and its shareholders); Id. § 310 (fiduciary duty of loyalty
in interested director transactions); Id. § 1203 (provides protection to shareholders in the
event of a management buyout); see also Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93,
110, 460 P.2d 464, 472, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (1969) (Directors have a duty to act with
"inherent fairness" to the corporation and its shareholders.).
186. CONCURRENCE, supra note 183, at 2.
187. See supra text accompanying note 162.
188. See supra text accompanying note 3.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
more lenient, states have still been takeover targets. Shark repellents
alone may deter but cannot thwart a hostile takeover attempt. 1 '
Thus, it is somewhat ironic that provisions intended to provide share-
holders with control over corporations have made a hostile takeover
more feasible, thereby lessening the minority shareholder's power.
And yet the minority shareholder usually profits from takeover
activity.
However, from the standpoint of social responsibility there is a
broader goal to this new legislation than merely protecting incum-
bent management, perhaps at the expense of the minority share-
holder. The California economy is in a perilous position unless the
state strengthens its role in the area of corporate governance. 92 The
California legislature apparently has made a concerted effort to
enter the "race to the bottom" in order to remedy this situation.
Whether these changes are "too little, too late" remains to be seen
as the corporate world continues to funnel down to a few corporate
giants already firmly entrenched in Delaware and other
jurisdictions. 93
Furthermore, the court system in Delaware has led, in part, to
that state's preeminence in corporate governance. 94 Whether the
California courts will take their cue from the legislature and become
more hospitable to corporate management remains an open question.
In the meantime, however, California has protected itself from any
further loss of control over the corporations within its boundaries. If
the remaining California corporations flock to adopt these new provi-
sions, it will indicate that the legislature attained its goal and that
California may have taken a step toward a position of prominence in
the area of corporate governance.
SUSAN A. RosE
191. Memorandum, supra note 73, at 4.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 60-70. For an interesting side effect of the
takeover trend see L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1989, at A26, col. 1. This article discusses a
sixteen percent decline in donations to the needy by the giants in the food industry in
1989 and attributes this decline to the rise in corporate takeovers "that have left food
industry executives glued to the bottom line and less concerned about the needy." Id.
193. See, e.g., The Role of Giant Corporations in the American and World Econo-
mies: Corporate Secrecy. Overviews, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the
Select Comm. on Small Bus., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) reprinted in R. HAIILTON,
supra note 50, at 519-20 ("These few corporations have become much larger in economic
size and power than either the States that chartered them or the markets in which they
buy and sell.") Id.
194. See supra text accompanying note 5.
